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Rationalizable Implementation

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Olivier Tercieux

Abstract

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000000022.

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Date of creation: 17 Mar 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000022

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References

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  1. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2010. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000017, David K. Levine.
  4. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  5. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity Of Mixed Equilibria In Mechanisms: A Unified Approach To Exact And Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
  7. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  8. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  10. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics," Working Papers 2007-16, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  11. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2012. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1146, The University of Melbourne.
  12. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2009. "Continuous Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0090, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  13. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  14. Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January.
  15. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Corbae, Dean & Marimon, Ramon, 2011. "Introduction to Incompleteness and Uncertainty in Economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 775-784, May.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Healy, Paul J. & Mathevet, Laurent, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  7. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2011. "Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 527-533, March.
  8. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.
  9. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.

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