A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies
AbstractImplementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deceptionproofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-2.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912
mechanism design; exact and approximate implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; measurability;
Other versions of this item:
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2010-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-05-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2010-05-08 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2009.
"Robust virtual implementation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 4(1), March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine,"
2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.