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On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality

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Author Info
Hitoshi Matsushima (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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Abstract

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design with weak informational assumptions is the most important to make as the first step towards a practically useful theory. This paper will emphasize that even if we confine our attentions to detail-free mechanisms with week rationality, there still exist a plenty of scope for development of new ideas on how to design a mechanism to play the powerful role. We briefly explain my recent works on this line, and argue that the use of stochastic decision works much in large exchange economics, and agents' moral preferences can drastically improve implementability of social choice functions.

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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-287.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf287

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Jeroen Swinkels, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 1192, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1990. "Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 109-112, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2033, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993. "Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2002. "Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 421-436, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
  18. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  21. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 371-375, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Papers e-91-2, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
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  24. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  27. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
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