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On Detail-Free Mechanism Design And Rationality

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  • HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA

Abstract

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design with weak informational assumptions is the most important to make as the first step towards a practically useful theory. This paper will emphasize that even if we confine our attentions to detail-free mechanisms with week rationality, there still exist a plenty of scope for development of new ideas on how to design a mechanism to play the powerful role. We briefly explain my recent works on this line, and argue that the use of stochastic decision works much in large exchange economics, and agents' moral preferences can drastically improve implementability of social choice functions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Japanese Economic Association in its journal The Japanese Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 56 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 41-54

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:1:p:41-54

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  1. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  2. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1990. "Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 109-112, October.
  3. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Large Auction Design in Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-282, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  5. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April.
  6. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  7. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  10. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September.
  11. Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
  13. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 371-375, December.
  15. Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993. "Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February.
  16. McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April.
  17. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  18. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2002. "Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 421-436, February.
  19. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  20. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Working Paper Series in Economics 53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.

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