Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection
AbstractThis paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementaion models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 93 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Arya, A. & Glover, J. & Rajan, U., 1999. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," GSIA Working Papers 1999-8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Ex Post Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1502, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Pereira, Samuel C.A., 2009. "Ignorance in a multi-agent setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 264-266, December.
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