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On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection

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Author Info
Russell Cooper
Abstract

This paper considers the general structure of self-selection models. By imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences, we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process. We also discuss extensions of the basic model such as randomization.

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 647R.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1983
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Publication status: Published in Rand Journal of Economics (Winter 1985), 15(4): 568-577
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:647r

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. David Sappington, 1982. "Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 354-368, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bengt Holmstrom & Laurence Weiss, 1982. "Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications, Part I: Scale Effects," Discussion Papers 537, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Chari, V V, 1983. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 107-22, Supplemen.
    Other versions:
  7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  8. Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
  9. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Chiang, Raymond & Spatt, Chester S, 1982. "Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 155-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-99, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 407-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-07, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Spence, A Michael, 1980. "Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(5), pages 821-41, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, 1999. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 827-846, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks," Working papers 2004-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rajat Acharyya & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2005. "On Tariff, Quality Choice and Innovation in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with Discrete Preferences," Departmental Working Papers wp0504, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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