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• Jean-Jacques Laffont
• Eric S. Maskin

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 48 (1980)
Issue (Month): 6 (September)
Pages: 1507-20
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:48:y:1980:i:6:p:1507-20

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