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Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information

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Author Info
David Sappington

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Abstract

The optimal regulatory strategy to promote research and development aimed at cost reduction is derived for an environment in which the firm's information about the technology of cost reduction, although initially imperfect, is better than that of the regulator. The manner in which the optimal regulatory strategy varies with changes in the informational environment is also described.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28198223%2913%3A2%3C354%3AORORAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 354-368
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:autumn:p:354-368

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Russell Cooper, 1983. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 647R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer., 1999. "Delegating Investment in a Common-Value Project," Economics Working Papers E99-266, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Chifeng Dai, 2008. "Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 75-85, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rajeev K. Goel, 1999. "On contracting for uncertain R&D," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 99-106.
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