Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information
AbstractThe optimal regulatory strategy to promote research and development aimed at cost reduction is derived for an environment in which the firm's information about the technology of cost reduction, although initially imperfect, is better than that of the regulator. The manner in which the optimal regulatory strategy varies with changes in the informational environment is also described.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2000.
"Delegating Investment in a Common-Value Project,"
- Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1999. "Delegating Investment in a Common-Value Project," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4vb8z67z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Suzanne Scotchmer., 1999. "Delegating Investment in a Common-Value Project," Economics Working Papers E99-266, University of California at Berkeley.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.