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Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander, Corinne
  • Ivanic, Rasto
  • Rosch, Stephanie
  • Tyner, Wallace
  • Wu, Steven Y.
  • Yoder, Joshua R.

Abstract

This article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops. We discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges. We focus primarily on the “mechanism design” or “complete contracts” approach to contracting, which involves optimizing some objective function (e.g. profits, costs, etc.) with respect to contract terms, subject to important incentive constraints. The solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and/or minimize costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander, Corinne & Ivanic, Rasto & Rosch, Stephanie & Tyner, Wallace & Wu, Steven Y. & Yoder, Joshua R., 2012. "Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 970-979.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:34:y:2012:i:4:p:970-979
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.05.013
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    Cited by:

    1. Bergtold, Jason S. & Shanoyan, Aleksan & Fewell, Jason E. & Williams, Jeffery R., 2017. "Annual bioenergy crops for biofuels production: Farmers' contractual preferences for producing sweet sorghum," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 724-731.
    2. McCarty, Tanner & Sesmero, Juan, 2021. "Contracting for perennial energy crops and the cost-effectiveness of the Biomass Crop Assistance Program," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    3. Wamisho, Kassu, 2016. "The Role of Vertical Integration, Risk and Uncertainty in Biomass Supply," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235769, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. McCarty, Tanner & Sesmero, Juan & Gramig, Ben, 2016. "Contracting for Perennial Energy Crops Under Uncertainty and Costly Reversibility," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 236092, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Steven Y. Wu, 2014. "Adapting Contract Theory to Fit Contract Farming," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1241-1256.
    6. Fedorov, Semyon & Lavrutich, Maria & Hagspiel, Verena & Lerdahl, Thomas, 2022. "Risk and benefit sharing schemes in oil exploration and production," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    7. Kassu Wamisho Hossiso & Aaron Laporte & David Ripplinger, 2017. "The Effects of Contract Mechanism Design and Risk Preferences on Biomass Supply for Ethanol Production," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(3), pages 339-357, June.
    8. Rosburg, Alicia & Miranowski, John & McFadden, Jonathan, 2016. "Mitigating Feedstock Supply Risk in Corn Stover Biofuel Production," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235875, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    9. Wamisho, Kassu & De Laporte, Aaron & Ripplinger, David, 2015. "Biomass Contracts for Ethanol Production: The Role of Farmer’s Risk Preferences," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205703, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    10. Leibensperger, Carrie & Yang, Pan & Zhao, Qiankun & Wei, Shuran & Cai, Ximing, 2021. "The synergy between stakeholders for cellulosic biofuel development: Perspectives, opportunities, and barriers," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    11. Clark Lundberg & Tristan Skolrud & Bahram Adrangi & Arjun Chatrath, 2021. "Oil Price Pass through to Agricultural Commodities†," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(2), pages 721-742, March.
    12. Glithero, N.J. & Ramsden, S.J. & Wilson, P., 2013. "Barriers and incentives to the production of bioethanol from cereal straw: A farm business perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 161-171.
    13. Galik, Christopher S., 2015. "Exploring the determinants of emerging bioenergy market participation," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 107-116.
    14. Dalemans, Floris & Muys, Bart & Verwimp, Anne & Van den Broeck, Goedele & Bohra, Babita & Sharma, Navin & Gowda, Balakrishna & Tollens, Eric & Maertens, Miet, 2018. "Redesigning oilseed tree biofuel systems in India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 631-643.
    15. Dalemans, Floris & Muys, Bart & Maertens, Miet, 2019. "Adoption Constraints for Small-scale Agroforestry-based Biofuel Systems in India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 27-39.
    16. Wu, Steven Y., 2021. "Determinants of Relational Contract Performance: Experimental Evidence," 2021 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting (Virtual), January 3-5, 2021, San Diego, California 308455, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    17. Majeed, Fahd & Khanna, Madhu & Miao, Ruiqing & Kaiyu, Guan & Kent, Jeffery, 2023. "The Cost of Carbon Farming to Decarbonize the Economy," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 335923, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    18. Hendalianpour, Ayad & Liu, Peide & Amirghodsi, Sirous & Hamzehlou, Mohammad, 2022. "Designing a System Dynamics model to simulate criteria affecting oil and gas development contracts," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    19. Fewell, Jason E. & Bergtold, Jason S. & Williams, Jeffery R., 2016. "Farmers' willingness to contract switchgrass as a cellulosic bioenergy crop in Kansas," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 292-302.
    20. Okwo, Adaora & Thomas, Valerie M., 2014. "Biomass feedstock contracts: Role of land quality and yield variability in near term feasibility," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 67-80.
    21. Sant’Anna, Ana Claudia & Bergtold, Jason S. & Shanoyan, Aleksan & Caldas, Marcellus M. & Granco, Gabriel, 2022. "Biofuel feedstock contract attributes, substitutability and tradeoffs in sugarcane production for ethanol in the Brazilian Cerrado: A stated choice approach," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 665-679.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract theory; Mechanism design; Biofuels; Dedicated energy crops;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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