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On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

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Eric Maskin () (School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study)

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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0008.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2001
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Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, Vol. 46(4) 2002, pp. 725-733
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0008

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Segal, Ilya, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1994. "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1085-1124, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Martin Nell & Andreas Richter & Jörg Schiller, 2005. "When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods," Risk and Insurance 0501002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005. "Testing out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer," NBER Working Papers 11110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl, 2009. "Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200909, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000638, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Nabil Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Undescribable Contingencies," Discussion Papers 1370, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, . "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000875, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Florin Bilbiie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Papers 2005-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  10. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem," Working Papers 2004-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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