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On partial contracting Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Aghion, Philippe
Dewatripont, Mathias
Rey, Patrick
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4-5 (May)
Pages: 745-753
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:745-753Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
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