Delegation, externalities and organizational design
AbstractIn a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Delegation; Hierarchy; Asymmetric information;
Other versions of this item:
- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2007. "Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design," CREPP Working Papers 0709, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
- A. Gautier & D. Paolini, 2007. "Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design," Working Paper CRENoS 200710, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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