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Delegation, externalities and organizational design

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  • Axel Gautier

    ()
    (Université de Liège)

  • Dimitri Paolini

    ()
    (CRENoS and DEIR, University of Sassari)

Abstract

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 2683-2692

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00532

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Keywords: Delegation; Hierarchy; Asymmetric information;

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References

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  1. GAUTIER, Axel & PAOLINI, Dimitri, . "Delegation and information revelation," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -2018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  3. Dessein, Wouter, 2002. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 811-38, October.
  4. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "On partial contracting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 745-753, May.
  5. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  6. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March.
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Cited by:
  1. M. Pitzalis & I. Sulis & M. Porcu, 2008. "Differences of Cultural Capital among Students in Transition to University. Some First Survey Evidences," Working Paper CRENoS 200805, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  2. I. Sulis & M. Porcu, 2008. "Assessing the Effectiveness of a Stochastic Regression Imputation Method for Ordered Categorical Data," Working Paper CRENoS 200804, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

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