Delegation and Information Revelation
AbstractThis paper analyzes, in a setup where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter, and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the first decision tothe agent, his choice may indicate the information that he possesses. If the principal retains control over the second decision, discovering this information is valuable. Hence, this paper provides a new rationale for delegation: A transfer of control to the informed party can be used to discover private information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2002. "Delegation and Information Revelation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse18_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- GAUTIER, Axel & PAOLINI, Dimitri, . "Delegation and information revelation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2000. "Delegation and Information Revelation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1292, Econometric Society.
- Gautier, Axel & Paolini, Dimitri, 2000. "Delegation and information revelation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000015, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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