Information revelation and repeated delegation
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/7038.
Date of creation: 1993
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Publication status: Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (1993) v.5,p.98-117
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- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2007.
"Delegation and Information Revelation,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 574-597, December.
- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2000. "Delegation and Information Revelation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1292, Econometric Society.
- GAUTIER, Axel & PAOLINI, Dimitri, . "Delegation and information revelation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Axel Gautier & Dimitri Paolini, 2002. "Delegation and Information Revelation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse18_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Gautier, Axel & Paolini, Dimitri, 2000. "Delegation and information revelation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000015, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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