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A theory of responsibility centers

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Author Info
Melumad, Nahum
Mookherjee, Dilip
Reichelstein, Stefan

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V87-458X244-2/2/44dfeb1a9542aea896c0010fdcc262f8
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 445-484
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:15:y:1992:i:4:p:445-484

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