In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.
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Paper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number
200710.
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