Competition and trust: Evidence from German car manufacturers
Abstract
We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyer trust, that higher levels of trust mitigate relationship-specific underinvestment in a classical hold-up situation. Moreover, contrary to the extant literature, we show that higher levels of supplier's trust are reflected in the buyer's choice of a more competitive procurement strategy among potential suppliers. --Download Info
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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 11-072.Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11072
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Related research
Keywords: trust; hold-up problem; competition; specific investment; suppliers; car manufacturers; German automotive industry;Other versions of this item:
- Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad O., 2011. "Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 349, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad O, 2011. "Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8265, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Konrad O. Stahl, 2011. "Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CESifo Working Paper Series 3358, CESifo Group Munich.
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-02-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-20 (Industrial Competition)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Dietmar Harhoff & Elisabeth Mueller & John Van Reenen, 2013.
"What are the Channels for Technology Sourcing? Panel Data Evidence from German Companies,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1193, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Harhoff, Dietmar & Mueller, Elisabeth & Van Reenen, John, 2012. "What are the channels for technology sourcing? Panel data evidence from German companies," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 187, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
- Harhoff, Dietmar, 2012.
"What are the Channels for Technology Sourcing? Panel Data Evidence from German Companies,"
Discussion Papers in Business Administration
14327, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
- Harhoff, Dietmar & Mueller, Elisabeth & Van Reenen, John, 2012. "What are the channels for technology sourcing? Panel data evidence from German companies," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 187, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
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