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Optimal Penalties in Contracts

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Author Info
Aaron S. Edlin (University of California, Berkeley)
Alan Schwartz (Yale University)

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Abstract

Contract law's liquidated damage rules prevent enforcement of contractual damage measures that require the promisor, if it breaches, to transfer to the promisee a sum that exceeds the net gain the promisee expected to make from performance; but these rules permit the promisor to transfer less than the promisee's expectation. We define a contractual damage multiplier as any number between zero and infinity by which the promisee's expected gain -- its expectation interest -- is multiplied. Multipliers of one or less thus comply with the liquidated damage rules while multipliers that exceed one do not; the high multipliers are unenforceable penalties. This paper shows that multipliers of any size can be efficient or inefficient, depending on the parties' purposes in creating them. For example, a multiplier that exceeds one will decrease welfare if used by a seller with market power to deter entry; but will increase welfare if used by parties to induce efficient relation specific investment. As a consequence, a court should inquire, not into the size of the multiplier, but into the purpose the multiplier serves for the parties.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0303002.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 27 Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0303002

Note: 29 pages, Adobe.pdf
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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  1. Dennis Powers, 2006. "Credit Constraints and Contract Enforcement," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1156-1156. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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