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Implementing Coordinated Team Play

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  • Anil Arya
  • Jonathan Glover
  • John S. Hughes

Abstract

This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ohio State University in its series Corporate Finance & Organizations with number _006.

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Handle: RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_006

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References

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  1. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
  3. Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
  4. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  5. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July.
  6. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  7. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  8. Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan, 1995. "A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 507-521, August.
  9. Ma, Ching-To, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 555-72, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00240716, HAL.
  2. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April.
  3. Philip Bond & Rohini Pande, 2005. "Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?," Working Papers 924, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  4. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.

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