This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Implementing Coordinated Team Play

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Anil Arya
Jonathan Glover
John S. Hughes

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Thomas Krichel)
File Format: application/msword
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ohio State University in its series Corporate Finance & Organizations with number _006.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_006

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 700 Fisher Hall, 2100 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1144
Phone: 614-292-5026
Fax: 614-292-2418
Web page: http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00240716_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.