This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Voluntary Implementation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jackson, Matthew O.
Palfrey, Thomas R.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint de nes an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation, and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary implementation, and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1077c.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1077.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, V. 98, #1, 2001, pp. 1-25
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1077

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
Phone: 626 395-4065
Fax: 626 405-9841
Email:
Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss

Order Information:
Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Victoria Mason).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  2. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1751, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  4. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Hughes, John S., 1997. "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  11. Chakravorti, B. & Corchon, L.C., 1992. "Credible Implementation," Papers 76, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
    Other versions:
  12. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 600-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hideo Konishi & Taiji Furusawa, 2008. "Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2008.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  7. Juan Perote Peña, 2003. "Ethical Implementation and the Creation of Moral Values," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/25, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
  8. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Working Papers 305, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  12. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.