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Ex Post Implementation

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

Abstract

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicityno veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints. In many economically significant environments, ex post implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation). The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. Ex post implementation in the direct mechanism is also possible in this case. We describe an example where the Pareto correspondence fails ex post monotonicity but Maskin monotonicity is satisfied.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001110.

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Date of creation: 08 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001110

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May.
  2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  5. Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003. "Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 839, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  10. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-34, January.
  11. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  12. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-91, June.
  13. Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo, 2004. "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 174-188, January.
  14. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
  15. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  16. Manishi Prasad & Peter Wahlqvist & Rich Shikiar & Ya-Chen Tina Shih, 2004. "A," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 22(4), pages 225-244.
  17. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  18. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Arya, A. & Glover, J. & Rajan, U., 1999. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 1999-8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  20. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Oleksii Birulin, 2003. "Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 675-683, October.
  23. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Sushil Bikhchandani, 2004. "The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000514, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  26. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2006. "Ex post implementation in environments with private goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 369-393, September.
  27. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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