We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and--in economic environments--sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by Maskin monotonicity. The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. We further describe a Pareto correspondence that fails ex post monotonicity but satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
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Volume (Year): 63 (2008) Issue (Month): 2 (July) Pages: 527-566 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006.
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Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004.
"Secure Implementation,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005.
"Secure Implementation,"
Economics Working Papers
0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007.
"Secure implementation,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, September.
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Jackson, Matthew O, 1991.
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Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
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Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001.
"Implementation Theory,"
Working Papers
5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
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Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
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