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Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade

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Fieseler, Karsten
Kittsteiner, Thomas
Moldovanu, Benny

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-48R1TRW-B/2/ebe3702191d5e91d6b40b5969a067a79
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 113 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 223-234
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:113:y:2003:i:2:p:223-234

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Schweizer, Urs, 1998. "Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results," Discussion Paper Serie A 590, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2003. "Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 54-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1248, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Helmut Bester & Karl Warneryd, . "Conflict Resolution under Asymmetric Information," Papers 006, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561RR, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ferreira, Daniel & Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2007. "Unbundling Ownership and Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Yuji Fujinaka, 2008. "A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division," ISER Discussion Paper 0721, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Daniel Ferreira & Emanuel Ornelas & John L. Turner, 2005. "Ownership Structure and the Market for Corporate Control," IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers 2005-09, Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Martimort, David & De Donder, Philippe & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," IDEI Working Papers 212, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Ex Post Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1502, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Hans Peter Grüner & Alexandra Kiel, 2001. "Collective decisions with interdependent valuations," GK working paper series 2001-02, Post Graduate Programme "Allocation on Financial Markets", University of Mannheim, revised Sep 2001. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000379, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. John L. Turner & Emanuel Ornelas, 2004. "Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 286, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Papers 94, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Grüner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra, 2001. "Collective Decisions with Interdependent Valuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2000. "Partnerships and Double Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-15, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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