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Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

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  • Bumin Yenmez, M.

Abstract

I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 48 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 77-82

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:2:p:77-82

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Efficient mechanisms; Multidimensional types; Multi-object auctions;

References

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  1. Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "When Queuening is Better than Push and Shove," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 615-32, May.
  3. Moldovanu, Benny & Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas, 1999. "Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-18, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  4. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  5. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach," Game Theory and Information 0202003, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2002.
  7. Steven R. Williams, 1999. "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
  8. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  9. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  10. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
  11. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-19, July.
  12. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
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Cited by:
  1. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe & Jianpei Li, 2014. "Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 127-150, June.
  2. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.

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