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A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types

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  • Tilman Borgers
  • Peter Norman

Abstract

We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.

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File URL: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/pnorman/Research/budgetbalance3.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000147.

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Date of creation: 24 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000147

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  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  2. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
  3. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
  4. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2002. "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2002048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1511R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
  7. Bose, Subir & Ozdenoren, Emre & Pape, Andreas, 2006. "Optimal auctions with ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 411-438, December.
  8. Eso, Peter & Futo, Gabor, 1999. "Auction design with a risk averse seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 71-74, October.
  9. Cremer, Jacques, & Riordan, Michael H, 1985. "A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 77-84, January.
  10. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1063-1107, 07.
  11. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May.
  12. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  14. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  15. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  16. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  17. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe, 2010. "How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1517, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Peter Norman & Hanming Fang, 2010. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1185, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1441R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
  4. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
  5. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
  6. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  7. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 107, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.
  9. Bierbrauer, Felix J., 2011. "Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 553-569.
  10. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
  11. Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 503-512, March.
  12. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.

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