1. Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Papers 9120, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
3. Michael H. Riordan, 1983. "Contracting in an Idiosyncratic Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 338-350, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Chung, Kim-Sau, 1999. "A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 429-433, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Walker, Mark, 1980. "On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1521-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Battacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-50, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
12. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1982. "Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 83-103, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Jacques Cremer & Michael H. Riordan, 1987. "On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 436-451, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Zellner, Arnold, 1985. "Bayesian Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 253-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 83-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Cremer, Jacques, & Riordan, Michael H, 1985. "A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 77-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Forges, F. & Mertens, J.-F. & Vohra, R., 2001. "The Ex Ante incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Papers 0101, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
22. d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1990. "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 233-254, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ichiro Obara, . "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000171, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
   • Borgers, Tilman & Norman, Peter, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Micro Theory Working Papers norman-05-02-08-08-39-42, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Tilman Borgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000147, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
   • Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007. "Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 1-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)