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Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

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  • Eilat, Ran
  • Pauzner, Ady
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    Abstract

    We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 71 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 503-512

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:503-512

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords: Bilateral trade Multiple objects Buyer-seller problem Bargaining Mechanism design Private values;

    References

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    1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Whinston, Michael D, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-83, May.
    2. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    3. Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
    4. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1441R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2005. "Contract theory," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9543, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000171, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November.
    9. Avery, Christopher & Hendershott, Terrence, 2000. "Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 483-97, July.
    10. Cohn, Zachary, 2010. "A note on linked bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 238-247, March.
    11. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
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