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Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information

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  • Nicolás Figueroa

    ()

  • Vasiliki Skreta

    ()

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 15 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 213-243

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:213-243

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Related research

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Type-dependent outside options; Externalities; Mechanism design; Interdependent values; D44; C7; C72;

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References

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  1. Levin, Jonathan, 1997. "An Optimal Auction for Complements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 176-192, February.
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
  3. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
  5. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
  6. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
  7. Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, 2004. "An optimal auction with identity-dependent externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 254, Econometric Society.
  8. Avery, Christopher & Hendershott, Terrence, 2000. "Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 483-97, July.
  9. Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison, 2007. "Position Auctions with Consumer Search," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001633, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  11. Varian, Hal R., 2007. "Position auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1163-1178, December.
  12. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
  13. repec:att:wimass:9008 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 77-101.
  15. Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, 2008. "An optimal auction with identity-dependent externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 731-746.
  16. Gale, Ian, 1990. "A multiple-object auction with superadditive values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December.
  17. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January.
  18. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  19. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
  20. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.

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