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On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

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  • Vasiliki Skreta

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001789.

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Date of creation: 18 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001789

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
  4. Simon Board, 2009. "Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 125-135, January.
  5. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Jullien, B. & Mariotti, T., 2006. "Auction and the informed seller problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 225-258, August.
  7. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480.
  8. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp350, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  9. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 671, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  10. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
  11. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005. "Information in Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1532R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2006.
  13. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "Note on Optimal Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile 232, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  14. Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2006. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000140, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers, CEMFI wp2005_0503, CEMFI.
  16. Cella, Michela, 2008. "Informed principal with correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 433-456, November.
  17. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 213-243, September.
  19. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  20. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auctions with General Distribution," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 08-15, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  21. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Lucia Quesada, 2005. "Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0504002, EconWPA.
  23. Tisljar, Rolf, 2003. "Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-8, October.
  24. Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  26. Cai, Hongbin & Riley, John & Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Reserve price signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 253-268, July.
  27. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  28. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 08-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  29. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
  30. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Marco Ottaviani, 2000. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1479, Econometric Society.
  32. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2006. "Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 293-299, May.
  33. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  34. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  35. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  36. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
  37. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On information and competition in private value auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006.
  38. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
  39. Todd Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 269-302, June.
  40. Hansen, Robert G, 2001. "Auctions of Companies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 30-43, January.
  41. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.
  42. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  43. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  44. Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 181-207, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2013. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 13-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  4. Suvorov Anton & Tsybuleva Natalia, 2010. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, November.
  5. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  6. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.

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