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On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

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Vasiliki Skreta
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001789.

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Date of creation: 18 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001789

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  1. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "A Note on Optimal Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000232, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Michela Cella, 2007. "Informed Principal with Correlation," UNIMI - Research Papers in Economics, Business, and Statistics 1057, Universitá degli Studi di Milano. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tisljar, Rolf, 2003. "Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-8, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations," Economics Working Papers 671, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Jullien, B. & Mariotti, T., 2006. "Auction and the informed seller problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 225-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hansen, Robert G, 2001. "Auctions of Companies," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 30-43, January.
  13. Lucia Quesada, 2005. "Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem," Game Theory and Information 0504002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Marco Ottaviani & Andrea Prat, 2001. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1673-1683, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  18. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
  25. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Documentos de Trabajo 231, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
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  26. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005. "Information in Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1532R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  32. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2006. "Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 293-299, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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