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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 125-135
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:125-135

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Related research

Keywords: Auctions; Information revelation; Bundling; D44; D82; L12;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
2. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-83, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994. "Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 309-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
7. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
   Other versions:
   • Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
9. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations," Economics Working Papers 671, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
10. Vagstad, S., 2001. "Should Auctioneers Supply Early Information for Prospective Bidders?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0701, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    Other versions:
    • Vagstad, Steinar, 2007. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.