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Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eric Rasmusen (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)
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Suppose a bidder must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating his own private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder would like to know the private values of other bidders. It also can explain sniping — flurries of bids at the end of auctions with deadlines — as the result of other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder to examine his value.
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Paper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number
2004-13.
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Date of creation: 2004Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2006Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-13Contact details of provider: Postal: 1309 East Tenth Street, Room 451, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701 Phone: 812-855-9219 Fax: 812-855-3354 Email: Web page: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/bepp/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Eric Rasmusen, 2007.
"Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery ,"
Working Papers
2007-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Janssen, Maarten & Rasmusen, Eric, 2002.
"Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty ,"
Journal of Industrial Economics ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen, 2001.
"Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-117, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!] Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen, 2000.
"Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
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[Downloadable!] Eric Rasmusen, 1996.
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Industrial Organization
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[Downloadable!] Maarten C.W. Janssen & Eric Rasmusen, 1998.
"Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
98-083/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!] McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983.
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Econometrica ,
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Hausch, Donald B & Li, Lode, 1993.
"A Common Value Auction Model with Endogenous Entry and Information Acquisition ,"
Economic Theory ,
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Journal of the European Economic Association ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David Hirshleifer, 1989.
"Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target ,"
University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management
1193, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
[Downloadable!]
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001.
"The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 195-202, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Charles D. Kolstad Rolando M. Guzman, .
"Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
17-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Eric Rasmusen, 2001.
"Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs ,"
Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(advances/), pages 1000-1000.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994.
"Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Lixin Ye, 2004.
"Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry ,"
Contributions to Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1158-1158.
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Nicola Persico, 2000.
"Information Acquisition in Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
Other versions: Michael J. Fishman, 1988.
"A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2000.
"Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1927, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Eric Rasmusen, 2007.
"Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery ,"
Working Papers
2007-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Cotton, Christopher, 2007.
"Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations ,"
MPRA Paper
1844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007.
"Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions ,"
FEMM Working Papers
07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
[Downloadable!]
Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction
2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!] Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E Roth, 2003.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
506439000000000433, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
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