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Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions

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  • Ku, Gillian
  • Malhotra, Deepak
  • Murnighan, J. Keith
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

    Volume (Year): 96 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 89-103

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:96:y:2005:i:2:p:89-103

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    References

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    1. Lucking-Reiley, David, 2000. "Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 227-52, September.
    2. Foreman, Peter & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1996. "Learning to Avoid the Winner's Curse," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 170-180, August.
    3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    4. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    5. Mano, Haim, 1994. "Risk-Taking, Framing Effects, and Affect," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 38-58, January.
    6. Pekka Hietala & Steven N. Kaplan & David T. Robinson, 2002. "What is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies," NBER Working Papers 9264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ordonez, Lisa & Benson, Lehman, 1997. "Decisions under Time Pressure: How Time Constraint Affects Risky Decision Making," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 121-140, August.
    8. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
    9. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments 00183, The Field Experiments Website.
    10. Rama Katkar & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results of Pok�mon Field Experiment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0026, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    11. Mano, Haim, 1992. "Judgments under distress: Assessing the role of unpleasantness and arousal in judgment formation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 216-245, July.
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    Cited by:
    1. Nichols, Bridget Satinover, 2012. "The development, validation, and implications of a measure of consumer competitive arousal (CCAr)," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 192-205.
    2. Lount Jr., Robert B. & Phillips, Katherine W., 2007. "Working harder with the out-group: The impact of social category diversity on motivation gains," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 214-224, July.
    3. Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
    4. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011. "Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 395-402.
    5. Ku, Gillian, 2008. "Learning to de-escalate: The effects of regret in escalation of commitment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 221-232, March.
    6. Sivanathan, Niro & Molden, Daniel C. & Galinsky, Adam D. & Ku, Gillian, 2008. "The promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 1-14, September.
    7. Reynolds, Kristy E. & Gilkeson, James H. & Niedrich, Ronald W., 2009. "The influence of seller strategy on the winning price in online auctions: A moderated mediation model," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 22-30, January.
    8. Migheli, Matteo, 2012. "It is not just escalation: The one dollar game revisited," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 434-438.
    9. McGee, Peter, 2013. "Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 312-326.
    10. Malhotra, Deepak, 2010. "The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 139-146, March.
    11. Glover, Brent & Raviv, Yaron, 2012. "Revenue non-equivalence between auctions with soft and hard closing mechanisms: New evidence from Yahoo!," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 129-136.
    12. Bucchianeri, Grace W. & Minson, Julia A., 2013. "A homeowner's dilemma: Anchoring in residential real estate transactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 76-92.

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