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Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target


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  • Hirshleifer, David


Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed bidders must incur costs to learn their (independent) valuations of a potential takeover target. The first bidder makes either a preemptive bid that will deter the second bidder from investigating, or a lower bid that will induce the second bidder to investigate and possibly compete. We show that the expected price of the target may be higher when the first bidder makes a deterring bid than when there is competitive bidding. Hence, by weakening the first bidder’s incentive to choose a preemptive bid, regulatory and management policies to assist competing bidders may reduce both the expected takeover price and social welfare.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA in its series University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management with number qt2496649g.

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Date of creation: 25 May 1989
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:anderf:qt2496649g

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