Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.
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Klein, Tobias & Lambertz, Christian & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad O., 2006.
"Last Minute Feedback,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions:
Tobias J. Klein & Christian Lambertz & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2005.
"Last Minute Feedback,"
Discussion Papers
62, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Mar 2006.
[Downloadable!]
Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
NBER Working Papers
13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)