The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at Drouot
Abstract"This paper studies multi-unit ascending (English) auctions with a buyer's option. The buyer's option gives the winner of an auction the right to purchase any number of units at the winning price. We develop a theoretical model and derive the optimal strategies for the bidders. The model predicts various behavioral implications (e.g., the winner never exercises the option, the price declines…) that are tested using a unique data set on wine auctions held at the Paris-based auction house Drouot. We also analyze why the buyer's option is used. Estimating the model in a structural econometric way, and using counterfactual comparisons, we find that the buyer's option does not affect the seller's revenue (relative to a system where the units are auctioned sequentially without the option). Drouot, however, saves a lot of time with the option and this effect represents a considerable amount of money. The time-saving effect seems thus to be the primary purpose of the buyer's option." Copyright Blackwell Publishing 2005.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 14 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
Other versions of this item:
- Février Philippe & Roos William & Visser Michael, 2004. "The buyer's option in multi-unit ascending auctions : the case of wine auctions at Drouot," Research Unit Working Papers 0409, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Hadj Ali H. & Lecocq S. & Visser M., 2007.
"The impact of gurus: Parker grades and en primeur wine prices¤,"
Working Papers ERMES
0718, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- HélaHadj Ali & Sébastien Lecocq & Michael Visser, 2008. "The Impact of Gurus: Parker Grades and "En Primeur" Wine Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(529), pages F158-F173, 06.
- Héla Hadj Ali & Sébastien Lecocq & Michael Visser, 2005. "The impact of gurus : Parker grades and en primeur wine prices," Research Unit Working Papers 0507, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- Ali, Hela Hadj & Lecocq, Sebastien & Visser, Michael, 2007. "The Impact of Gurus: Parker Grades and EN PRIMEUR Wine Prices," Working Papers 37292, American Association of Wine Economists.
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