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Eric B Rasmusen

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Personal Details

First Name: Eric
Middle Name: B
Last Name: Rasmusen
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pra42

Email:
Homepage: http://www.rasmusen.org
Postal Address: Dept. of Business Economics and Public Policy Kelley School of Business, Indiana University 1309 East Tenth Street Bloomington, Indiana 47405
Phone: 812-855-9219

Affiliation

Department of Business Economics and Public Policy
Kelley School of Business
Indiana University
Location: Bloomington, Indiana (United States)
Homepage: http://www.kelley.iu.edu/bepp/
Email:
Phone: 812-855-9219
Fax: 812-855-3354
Postal: 1309 East Tenth Street, Room 451, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701
Handle: RePEc:edi:dpiubus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan," Working Papers 2013-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  2. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond," Working Papers 2013-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  3. Rick Harbaugh & Eric Rasmusen, 2012. "Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information," Working Papers 2012-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  4. Christopher Connell & Eric Rasmusen, 2012. "Concavifying the Quasiconcave," Working Papers 2012-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  5. Eric Rasmusen, 2011. "Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power," Working Papers 2011-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Eric Rasmusen & Mark Ramseyer, 2010. "Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence," Working Papers 2010-18, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  7. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Quality-Ensuring Profits," Working Papers 2008-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  8. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Some Common Confusions about Hyperbolic Discounting," Working Papers 2008-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  9. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  10. Minoru Nakazato & Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records," Working Papers 2008-17, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  11. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Career Concerns and Ambiguity Aversion," Working Papers 2008-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  12. Barick Chung & Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Price Discrimination between Retailers with and without Market Power," Working Papers 2008-14, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  13. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Internalities and Paternalism: Applying the Compensation Criterion to Multiple Selves across Time," Working Papers 2008-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  14. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2007. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets," Caepr Working Papers 2007-017, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  15. Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "A Reputation Model of Quality in North-South Trade," Working Papers 2007-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  16. Eric Rasmusen, 2006. "The BLP Method of Demand Curve Estimation in Industrial Organization," Working Papers 2006-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  17. Nakazato, Minoru & Ramseyer, J. Mark & Rasmusen, Eric, 2006. "The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar: Levels and Determinants of Attorney Income," MPRA Paper 1444, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2005. "The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993," Working Papers 2005-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  19. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem," Working Papers 2004-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  20. Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Agency Law and Contract Formation," Working Papers 2004-14, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  21. Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase the Value of Options?," Finance 0409004, EconWPA.
  22. Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery," Industrial Organization 0409001, EconWPA.
  23. Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value?," Working Papers 2004-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  24. Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2004. "Norms in Law and Economics," Working Papers 2004-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  25. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-118, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  26. Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-127, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  27. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  28. Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "The Parking Lot Problem," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-119, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "The Parking Lot Problem," Working Papers 2007-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  29. Eric Rasmusen, 2000. "An Economic Approach to Adultery Law," Law and Economics 0003005, EconWPA.
  30. Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "The Games and Information Reader, Table of Contents," Game Theory and Information 9907002, EconWPA.
  31. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses," Law and Economics 9907003, EconWPA.
  32. Francis Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax," Public Economics 9907003, EconWPA.
  33. Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "ames and Information, Third Edition, Preface," Microeconomics 9907004, EconWPA.
  34. Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "The Objectives of Sexual Harassment Law, with Application to 1998's Ellerth, Oncale, and Faragher Decisions," Labor and Demography 9907002, EconWPA.
  35. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," Law and Economics 9907001, EconWPA.
  36. Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "The Games and Information Reader, Preface," Game Theory and Information 9907003, EconWPA.
  37. Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer & John Wiley, 1999. "Naked Exclusion: A Reply," Industrial Organization 9907001, EconWPA.
  38. Eric Rasmusen & Timothy Perri, 1999. "Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers do not Know the Sellers' Cost?," Industrial Organization 9907002, EconWPA.
  39. Rasmusen, E., 1998. "Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self Incrimination," Papers 98-001, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  40. Posner, R.A. & Rasmusen, E., 1998. "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions," Papers 98-005, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  41. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Eric Rasmusen, 1998. "Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-083/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  42. Rasmusen, E., 1998. "A Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts," Papers 98-007, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  43. Rasmussen, E., 1997. "Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract," Papers 97-001, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  44. Eric Rasmusen, 1996. "The Posner Argument for Transferring Health Spending from Old Women to Old Men," Public Economics 9607003, EconWPA.
  45. Eric Rasmusen, 1996. "Notes on Writing, Talking, and Listening," General Economics and Teaching 9607002, EconWPA.
  46. Eric Rasmusen, 1996. "Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games," Game Theory and Information 9607004, EconWPA.
  47. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 1996. "Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan," Public Economics 9603001, EconWPA.
  48. Eric Rasmusen & ., 1995. "``The Economics of Agency Law and Contract Formation''," Law and Economics 9506002, EconWPA.
  49. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, EconWPA.
  50. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "Observed Choice, Estimation, and Optimism About Policy Changes," Econometrics 9506004, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 1995.
  51. Rasmusen, E., 1994. "A Model of Negotiation, not Bargainig," Papers 94-007, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  52. Petrakis, E. & Rasmusen, E. & Roy, S., 1994. "The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry," Papers 94-004, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  53. Rasmusen, E. & Fernandez, L., 1993. "Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection," Papers 93-016, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  54. Rasmusen, E., 1993. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," Papers 93-017, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  55. Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Papers 92-019, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  56. Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing : A Unified Approach," Papers 92-020, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  57. Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law," Papers 92-022, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  58. Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1990. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives," UCLA Economics Working Papers 595, UCLA Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2012. "First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 374-405, 09.
  2. Eric Rasmusen, 2012. "Internalities and paternalism: applying the compensation criterion to multiple selves across time," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 601-615, April.
  3. Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2011. "Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 843-885, 09.
  4. Rasmusen, Eric, 2010. "Career concerns and ambiguity aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 175-177, August.
  5. Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2009. "Letter: Is There Research Economist Support for the Stimulus Bill?," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 1-2, February.
  6. Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2008. "Letter: What Economists Can Contribute to the Global Warming Debate," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 1-3, July.
  7. Ramseyer, J. Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B., 2007. "Political uncertainty's effect on judicial recruitment and retention: Japan in the 1990s," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 329-345, June.
  8. Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(5), pages 1647-1667, 2007 14.
  9. Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2006. "Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22, November.
  10. Rasmusen Eric B., 2006. "Letter: Must Homeowners Lose Wealth When House Prices Fall?," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-1, April.
  11. Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Agency Law and Contract Formation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 369-409.
  12. Janssen, Maarten & Rasmusen, Eric, 2002. "Bertrand Competition under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 11-21, March.
  13. Rasmusen, Eric B & Perri, Timothy J, 2001. "Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality when Buyers Do Not Know the Sellers' Cost?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 561-67, October.
  14. Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2001. "Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-39, October.
  15. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 53-88, January.
  16. R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel, 2000. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 316-342, October.
  17. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen & John Shepard Wiley, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 310-311, March.
  18. Frank Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, 2000. "The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 295-318, December.
  19. Posner, Richard A. & Rasmusen, Eric B., 1999. "Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 369-382, September.
  20. Rasmusen, Eric, 1998. "The observed choice problem in estimating the cost of policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 13-15, October.
  21. Rasmusen, Eric, 1998. "Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification : Timur Kuran, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 309-311, January.
  22. Rasmusen, Eric, 1998. " Observed Choice and Optimism in Estimating the Effects of Government Policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 65-91, October.
  23. Rasmusen, Eric, 1998. "The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 245-69, June.
  24. Emmanuel Petrakis & Eric Rasmusen & Santanu Roy, 1997. "The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 248-268, Summer.
  25. Rasmusen, Eric, 1997. " Choosing among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games: A Reply to Sloof," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 209-14, April.
  26. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 1997. "Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 259-86, October.
  27. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-43, October.
  28. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "The Posner argument for transferring health spending from old women to olden men," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 337-339, December.
  29. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 323-345, September.
  30. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 101-108, January.
  31. Rasmusen, Eric, 1994. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 63-83, April.
  32. Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. " Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 305-27, March.
  33. Rasmusen, Eric & Ayres, Ian, 1993. "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 309-43, June.
  34. Rasmusen, Eric, 1993. " Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 899-913, December.
  35. Rasmusen, Eric, 1992. "An Income-Satiation Model of Efficiency Wages," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 467-78, July.
  36. Rasmusen, Eric, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism and Rational Information Acquisition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 175-201, Spring.
  37. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December.
  38. Rasmusen, Eric B & Zupan, Mark A, 1991. " Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 167-91, December.
  39. Rasmusen, Eric & Zenger, Todd, 1990. "Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 65-92, Spring.
  40. Rasmusen, Eric, 1989. "A simple model of product quality with elastic demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 281-283.
  41. Rasmusen, Eric, 1988. "Mutual Banks and Stock Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 395-421, October.
  42. Rasmusen, Eric, 1988. "Entry for Buyout," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 281-99, March.
  43. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.

Chapters

  1. McAdams, Richard H. & Rasmusen, Eric B., 2007. "Norms and the Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.

NEP Fields

24 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2009-01-03
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2007-03-10 2007-03-10
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (5) 2007-09-24 2009-01-03 2009-01-03 2009-01-03 2013-12-15. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2009-01-03 2009-01-03 2012-11-03
  5. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (1) 2007-03-10
  6. NEP-HME: Heterodox Microeconomics (1) 2013-12-15
  7. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-12-15
  8. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2007-09-24
  9. NEP-INT: International Trade (1) 2007-03-10
  10. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (5) 2001-02-14 2001-02-14 2007-01-23 2009-01-03 2013-12-15. Author is listed
  11. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2007-09-24 2009-01-03
  12. NEP-MST: Market Microstructure (1) 2009-01-03
  13. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2007-09-24
  14. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (1) 1998-10-05
  15. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2001-08-30
  16. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2001-06-22
  17. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (2) 2001-08-30 2007-01-23
  18. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2009-01-03

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