The mutually beneficial connection between industries and the governments that regulate them is the subject of a large literature led by George Stigler (1971). What has not been studied is how firms choose their desired policies from the set including entry barriers, price floors, subsidies, and demand stimulation. The authors take as given that government and incumbents form the supply and demand for regulation and explore the choice of political product. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 72 (1991) Issue (Month): 2-3 (December) Pages: 167-91 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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