This paper uses the economic approach to address a recent legal quesiton involving self incrimination: what is the effect of allowing a defendant to waive his right to exclude statements he makes during plea bargaining from evidence at trial if plea bargaining fails? This was the issue in the 1995 Mazzanatto Supreme Court decision. What is the reason for such waivers, and do they increase or decrease the amount of plea bargaining.
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Paper provided by Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research in its series Papers with number
98-001.
Length: 52 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:indian:98-001
Contact details of provider: Postal: Indiana University, Center for Econometric Model Research, Department of Economics; Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812-855-1021 Fax: 812-855-3736 Email: Web page: http://www.indiana.edu/~econweb/ More information through EDIRC
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