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Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game

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  • Rasmusen, E.

Abstract

An independent judiciary faces the problem of how to restrain high-court judges from indulging their personal whims. One restraint is the desire of judges to influence future judges. To do so, judges may have to maintain their own or the system's legitimacy by restraining their own behavior. This situation can be viewed as an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. Such a game has many equilibria, some of which are Pareto superior to others. In some equilibria, self-interested judges are responsible even without the threat of external penalties. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Rasmusen, E., 1993. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," Papers 93-017, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:indian:93-017
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Matthew C. Stephenson, 2009. "Legal Realism for Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 191-211, Spring.
    3. Frank Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, 2000. "The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 295-318, December.
    4. Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan, 2018. "Learning While Setting Precedents," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1810, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    5. Gilat Levy, 2005. "Careerist Judges," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 275-297, Summer.
    6. Jordan van Rijn & Shuwei Zeng & Brent Hueth, 2023. "Do credit unions have distinct objectives? Evidence from executive compensation structures," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 5-38, March.
    7. Timothy M. Shaughnessy, 2005. "A Preliminary Analysis of Campaign Contributions in Florida's Legislative and Judicial Elections," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 20(Spring 20), pages 43-67.
    8. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 1996. "Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan," Public Economics 9603001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2002. "An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 379-421, September.
    10. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
    11. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2020. "Learning while setting precedents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1222-1252, December.
    12. Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, 2010. "Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 333-357, June.
    13. Álvaro Bustos & Nuno Garoupa, 2020. "An Integrated Theory of Litigation and Legal Standards," Documentos de Trabajo 536, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    14. Martin Andrew D. & Hazelton Morgan L.W., 2012. "What Political Science Can Contribute to the Study of Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 511-529, October.
    15. Adam B. Badawi & Scott Baker, 2015. "Appellate Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 139-172.
    16. Aldashev, Gani & Chaara, Imane & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Using the law to change the custom," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 182-200.
    17. Max Albert, 2006. "Product Quality in Scientific Competition," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    18. Carole M. Billiet & Thomas Blondiau & Sandra Rousseau, 2014. "Punishing environmental crimes: An empirical study from lower courts to the court of appeal," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 472-496, December.
    19. Rustam Romaniuc, 2012. "Judicial Dissent under Externalities and Incomplete Information," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 209-224, October.
    20. Joseph A. McCAHERY & Erik P.M. VERMEULEN & HISATAKE Masato & SAITO Jun, 2007. "Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal Reform: 'The New Company Law'," Discussion papers 07033, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    21. Robert P. Inman, 1996. "Do Balanced Budget Rules Work? U.S. Experience and Possible Lessons for the EMU," NBER Working Papers 5838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Christmann Robin, 2015. "Tipping the Scales – Settlement, Appeal and the Relevance of Judicial Ambition," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 171-207, July.

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