Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal Reform: 'The New Company Law'
In this paper, we have distinguished three different positions along the reform strategy spectrum of company law. The first position is located on the left side of the spectrum and closest to stasis - where virtually no effective legal changes can occur and where only the idea of reform clashes with legal tradition and standardization pressures. An example of a jurisdiction that takes this position is Germany. Along or near the mid-point of the spectrum, company law changes are less impeded by tradition and standardization factors, but more influenced by interest group pressures. We see England occupying this position. Japan can be seen as a more adaptable jurisdiction located toward the right end of the spectrum and therefore better able to create and introduce more functional legal rules and institutions that turn the traditional view of company law around. It is submitted that Singapore is located on the right side of the spectrum as its legislature is aware of the need to adapt the legal system to international business practices in order to develop a distinct jurisprudence, acclaimed for its efficiency and integrity, which is set apart from the English legal system.Length: 36 pages
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