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The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters

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  • Carney, William J

Abstract

This article explores the forces that drive the creation of corporate law. Costly rent extractions in corporate laws by interest groups, beyond those attainable through market transactions, raise costs for firms and lower returns for shareholders. Such gains for interest groups can survive only if local firms subject to such law are protected from firms operating under more efficient legal regimes. Competitive forces from outside a legal system weaken the power of interest groups to engage in rent-seeking activities and cause the resulting laws to be more public-regarding. The competitive difference between Europe and the United States is accounted for by the choice of an overarching legal rule for the United States-the presence of a common market, with its absence of tariffs, that makes exit from costly legal regimes by U.S. firms possible. These different competitive settings explain substantive differences in corporate laws. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Carney, William J, 1997. "The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 303-329, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:303-29
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. McCahery, J.A. & Vermeulen, E.P.M., 2004. "The changing landscape of EU company law," Discussion Paper 2004-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, 2002. "European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-71, January.
    3. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:4:p:751-772 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Roberta Romano, 2005. "Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2601, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2006.
    5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Oscar Gelderblom & Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, 2017. "The Emergence of the Corporate Form," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 193-236.
    6. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter & Neunzig, Alexander R., 2004. "Conflict of law rules and international trade : a transaction costs approach," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    8. McCahery, J.A. & Vermeulen, E.P.M., 2005. "Does the European company prevent the 'Delaware-effect'?," Discussion Paper 2005-010, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    9. Joseph A. McCAHERY & Erik P.M. VERMEULEN & HISATAKE Masato & SAITO Jun, 2007. "Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal Reform: 'The New Company Law'," Discussion papers 07033, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    10. Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, 1999. "Regulatory Competition: A Private International Law Approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 251-270, November.

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