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Learning while setting precedents

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  • Ying Chen
  • Hülya Eraslan

Abstract

A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on.

Suggested Citation

  • Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2020. "Learning while setting precedents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1222-1252, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:4:p:1222-1252
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Joosung Lee & Daniel Li, 2022. "Sequential Search With Adaptive Intensity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 803-829, May.

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