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Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments

Author

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  • Andreea Cosnita-Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of commitment decisions on the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. We discuss the optimal use of commitments considering past rulings as a source of knowledge to better assess future similar antitrust cases. Our framework combines two key effects: the deterrence of the anticompetitive behavior by the different enforcement regimes, and the dynamic perspective through litigation as a source of learning. We show that if the level of penalty is high enough, the antitrust authorities undervalue the dynamic informational benefit of litigation and tend to over-use commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2021. "Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments," Working Papers hal-04159724, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04159724
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04159724
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty & Simone Vannuccini, 2025. "Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions," Working Papers halshs-05188484, HAL.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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