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Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions

Author

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  • Patrice Bougette

    (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France)

  • Simone Vannuccini

    (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France)

Abstract

In abuses of dominance cases, competition authorities typically impose both pecuniary sanctions and behavioural injunctions. These instruments serve distinct but complementary functions: fines primarily deter anti-competitive behaviour; injunctions seek to restore conditions conducive to competition on the merits. Yet, the effectiveness of such behavioural remedies remains contested. They often entail long-term obligations and are vulnerable to strategic circumvention or to uncertainties inherent in competitive and technological dynamics. In this paper, focusing on the European Union (EU)'s context, we propose a two-tiered sanctioning framework that addresses the drawbacks of behavioural injuctions: an initial fine, payable immediately, and a conditional component whose imposition - both in terms of activation and magnitude - would depend on the observed implementation and effects of the behavioural obligations. This structure aims to enhance both the flexibility and credibility of remedies, while preserving deterrence.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty & Simone Vannuccini, 2025. "Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions," GREDEG Working Papers 2025-32, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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