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Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Bougette

    (Université Côte d'Azur
    GREDEG CNRS)

  • Oliver Budzinski

    (Technische Universität Ilmenau)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

Digital platforms, ecosystems, and R&D-intensive sectors pose distinctive challenges for merger control. In these fast-evolving markets, shaped by technological change and shifting competitive dynamics, traditional ex-ante reviews often fall short in anticipating long-term outcomes. This paper proposes a multi-step merger control model that includes a mechanism for remedy revision, allowing authorities to adjust behavioral commitments during their implementation. By embedding structured flexibility into merger decisions, our approach enables remedies to evolve in response to market reconfigurations, strategic conduct, or regulatory insights. The framework aims to ensure that remedies remain proportionate, effective, and legally predictable. By bridging ex-ante assessment and ex-post adaptation, it offers a policy instrument better suited to the uncertainties of dynamic competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2025. "Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition," GREDEG Working Papers 2025-22, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Merger control; merger remedies; dynamic competition; competition policy uncertainties; innovation; digital markets; mergers & acquisitions; merger waves;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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