The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
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- Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
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More about this item
Keywordsinformation acquisition; communication; coordination; collusion; expertise; organization;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-02-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2010-02-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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