Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses
AbstractThe tax office wins most cases in Japan. We think about why this might be. We find that although judges who rule in favor of the taxpayer do not suffer in their future careers, if the loser-- whether governemnt or taxpayer--appeals and wins, the reversed judge's career does take a turn for the worse. This implies that the government cares more about accurate judging than about pro-government judging.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 9907003.
Date of creation: 13 Jul 1999
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japan; tax law; judges; political economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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