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• Eric B Rasmusen

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 9506003.

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Date of creation: 14 Jun 1995
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9506003

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1. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1986. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," Working Papers 616, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Hylton, Keith N, 1993. "Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 187-210, January.
3. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Shanley, Michael G, 1991. "The Distribution of Posttrial Adjustments to Jury Awards," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 463-81, June.
5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
7. Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 307-401, January.
8. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?," NBER Working Papers 4586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    • Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
13. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1988. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 437-50, June.
    Other versions:
    • Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1987. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," NBER Working Papers 2161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Rasmusen, Eric, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism and Rational Information Acquisition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 175-201, Spring.
15. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
16. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability," NBER Working Papers 1834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Bharat Sarath, 1991. "Uncertain Litigation and Liability Insurance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 218-231, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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