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When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States

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Author Info
J. Mark Ramseyer (Harvard Law School)
Eric B. Rasmusen (Kelley School of Business, Indiana University and CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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Abstract

This is one chapter from the book, Judicial Independence: Economic Theory and Japanese Empirics, that Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen are writing. In preceding chapters we explain the institutions of modern Japan's judiciary and use regression analysis to test whether judges who rule in ways the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) disliked were penalized in their careers. We find that they were for some kinds of cases\involving such things as the constitutionality of the military, injunctions against the national (but not local) government, reapportionment, and electioneering laws. They were not penalized for other kinds of cases\tax and criminal cases. Those results are drawn from our earlier published papers, reorganized and synthesized for the present book. This chapter does not draw on our published work. It asks why the degree and type of independence of judges in modern Japan is different from that of other civil servants. In particular, we compare judges in modern Japan, pre-war Japan, and the United States; and we compare judges with other kinds of public employees, asking why they are not elected and why they are not directly under the control of politicians.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-126.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf126

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  1. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses," Law and Economics 9907003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Francis Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax," Public Economics 9907003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. de Figueiredo, John M & Tiller, Emerson H, 1996. "Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 435-62, October.
  4. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 1997. "Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 259-86, October.
  6. Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 215-28, April.
  7. Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. "The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 721-47, June.
  8. Moe, Terry M, 1991. "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 106-29, Special I.
  9. Cohen, Mark A, 1991. "Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 183-99, Spring.
  10. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
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  11. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 53-88, January.
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  12. Rasmusen, Eric, 1994. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 63-83, April.
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  13. Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 229-47, Fall.
  14. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cohen, Mark A., 1992. "The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 13-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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