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Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?

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Author Info
J. Mark Ramseyer (Harvard Law School)
Eric Rasmusen (Indiana University)

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Abstract

Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent -- why? On the one hand, because Japanese prosecutors are badly understaffed they may prosecute only their strongest cases and present judges only with the most obviously guilty defendants. On the other, because Japanese judges can be reassigned by the administrative office of the courts if they rule in ways the office does not like, judges may face biased career incentives to convict. Using data on the careers and opinions of 321 Japanese judges, we conclude that judges who acquit do indeed have worse careers following the acquittal. On closer examination, though, we find that the punished judges are not judges who acquitted on the ground that the prosecutors charged the wrong person. Rather, they are the judges who acquitted for reasons of statutory or constitutional interpretation, often in politically charged cases. Thus, the apparent punishment of acquitting judges seems unrelated to any pro-conviction bias at the judicial administrative offices, and the high conviction rates probably reflect low prosecutorial budgets instead.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 9907001.

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Date of creation: 12 Jul 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9907001

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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Japan; judges; political economy; prosecutors; convictions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

Cited by:
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  1. Manu Raghav, 2006. "Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?," Caepr Working Papers 2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  3. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martin Schneider, 2005. "Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 127-144, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200429, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2009. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints," Working Papers 2009-05, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 23 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 209-235, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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